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Commentary on "Prosecutions, Politics and the
Public Interest: Some Recent Developments in the
United Kingdom, Canada and Elsewhere"
Mary Condon
1. Introduction
Professor Stenning is to be congratulated for providing a
fresh and timely perspective on some crucial dilemmas of
prosecutorial decision-making, I and for grounding his incisive
analysis in a close discussion of a particularly provocative case
emerging from the U.K. House of Lords in 2008.2 The core
conundrum he addresses in his paper is the long-standing one of
what should be the contours of the role played by a
jurisdiction's Attorney General in prosecutorial decision-
making. The context here is one in which attorneys general
have multiple and significant responsibilities in governmental
arenas.3 Specifically, he poses two questions about the
Attorney General's role. The first is (i) are we close to
achieving "institutional arrangements and constitutional
conventions and practices" which will guarantee "a
satisfactory balance between political independence and
political accountability of those with ultimate responsibility
for prosecutorial decision-making?". The second question is (ii)
'are we closer to achieving consensus about what such a
* Osgoode Hall Law School.
1. Philip C. Stenning, "Prosecutions, Politics and the Public Interest: Some
Recent Developments in the United Kingdom, Canada and Elsewhere"
(2010), 55 C.L.Q. 449.
2. R (on the application of Corner House Research and others) 1'. Director of the
Serious Fraud Qffice, [20081 UKHL 60 (BAE case).
3. These include acting as chief legal advisor to the government, being the
representative of the Crown in criminal. prosecutions and, in some
jurisdictions, also cabinet membership.
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'satisfactory balance' might be?" The article ultimately answers
both of these questions in the negative.
In coming to this conclusion, Professor Stenning confronts
the idea that the best answer to the conundrum of the
appropriate balance to be drawn between the independence
of an Attorney General or a Director of Public Prosecutions
and the need for "political considerations" to be taken into
account in some decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute is the
one originally proposed by Professor Edwards in his 1964
book.4 That answer was that it all comes down to the "strength
of character and personal integrity" of the office-holder, who is
required to ensure his or her own independence of mind with
respect to the prosecutorial decision to be made. Professor
Stenning is skeptical of the idea that political considerations do
not play a role in some prosecutorial decision-making, and
indeed is equally skeptical of the supposed distinction between
partisan and non-partisan political considerations. Rather, he
argues that in a democracy it may be indeed be appropriate for
political considerations to play a role, thus erasing or severely
circumscribing the distance between "independent"
prosecutorial decision-making and politics. This amounts to
a plea for an acknowledgement that some prosecutorial
decisions are irreducibly political when they are being made.
Instead, Stenning argues for more transparency and
accountability for prosecutorial decision-making, whether
or not the official is an Attorney General or a Director of
Public Prosecutions. He cites the BAE case as an example of a
situation where robust levels of such accountability were
present. Indeed, though Stenning's paper does not dwell on
this, the BAE case is also an example where no-one involved
impugned the integrity of the Director of the Serious Fraud
Office who made the actual decision to close down the
investigation in that case.
In these brief comments, I want to concentrate on two issues
raised by Stenning's excellent paper. They are (i) do
contemporary cases like the BAE case highlight the need to
4. John LI. Edwards, The Law Officers of the Crown: A Study of the Offices of
Attorney-General and Solicitor-General of England (London, Sweet and
Maxwell, 1964).
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probe whether we have the right decision-making processes in
place to handle matters with elements of multi-jurisdictional,
foreign policy and defence-related as well as economic
concerns? (ii) do we need to interrogate the concept of the
"public interest" more closely in this context?
2. Do We Have the Right Decision-Making
Processes in Place?
The discussion in Professor Stenning'S paper about the
conditions needed to ensure appropriate discretionary
decision-making by an Attorney General seems particularly
interesting if we shift perspective to consider it through the lens
of other highly contested decision-making processes. Take for
example the corporate context. There has been much attention
paid to issues of corporate governance in recent years, 5
following well-publicized scandals and failures such as
Enron, Nortel and Hollinger. One result of all this legislative,
regulatory and public debate about governance in the
corporate context is that no-one thinks that a complete, or
even a primary, answer to the question of whether a
corporation is well governed or not lies in the personal
integrity of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Instead, good
governance is taken to reside in mechanisms for information-
sharing, up-the-line reporting, codes for avoiding conflicts of
interest, risk management processes and so on.6 In other words,
the emphasis is on processes for decision-making and whether
these are crafted appropriately.
Now Stenning might well respond that a focus on governance
processes in complex organizations is different from the kind of
episodic, discretionary decision-making, engaging multiple
political sensibilities, he is grappling with in his paper. My
answer would be that perhaps there is something to be learned
from our experience in designing governance process in other
5. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Pub.L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745); NI 58-101.
6. The literature here is voluminous. See for example, Christine Mallin,
Corporate Governance (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2007); Robert A.G.
Monks and Nell Minow, Corporate Governance, 3rd ed. (Blackwell, 2004);
Laura Spira, The Audit Committee (Boston, Kluwer, 2002); Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development, Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance (OECD, Paris, 2004).
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situations where discretionary decisions have to be made.7 In
the corporate context for example, a well-established antidote
to the perception of conflict of interest8 when a CEO or a board
of directors makes a decision is the need for independent
external advice, often from lawyers but also other relevant
professionals such as bankers or valuators.
In his paper, Stenning describes the "Shawcross doctrine",
which amounts to the opportunity for an Attorney General to
consult with his or her political colleagues about the
prosecutorial decision to be made, without impugning his or
her own independence of mind. In other words, a high priority
is placed on the role of other government ministers as sources of
knowledge and advice. This leads to a question about whether
there is some broader notion of consultation that could be
conceived of in cases such as the ones analyzed by Professor
Stenning. In the BAEcase, Stenning describes how the Director
of the Serious Fraud Office did obtain the expert assessments of
the British Ambassador as to the extent of the threat to
"national security" at the relevant time.
More generally, what would we learn from a focus on where
the gaps are in the processes used for decision-making in
sensitive prosecutorial cases? Stenning describes the need to
achieve consensus on "institutional arrangements and
constitutional conventions and practices" so as to guarantee a
balance between independence and political pressures. As I
have suggested, an area that could usefully be focused on in this
paper is that of the "practices" that are in fact deployed in this
kind of "high political" prosecutorial decision-making. Is it
possible to conceive of some kind of more detailed guidelines
with respect to issues such as who or what categories of people
to consult with, and how to reduce the presence of conflicts of
interest. I note of course that, at lower levels in the prosecutorial
hierarchy, there is a code for conduct for Crown prosecutors in
7. It should also be acknowledged that the question of whether corporate
organizations need to take account of the public interest in their decision-
making is currently a live and very thorny one in Canada. See BCE Inc.
(Arrangement relatif d), [2008] S.C.J. No. 37 (QL), 301 D.L.R. (4th) 80,
[20081 3 S.C.R. 560.
8. Something that is often at issue when an Attorney General is making a
sensitive prosecutorial decision.
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the United Kingdom and similar ones in Canada. 9 All of this is
to say that Stenning's paper ultimately puts a lot of faith in after
the fact accountability as an antidote to the possibility of
prosecutorial decision-making at the highest levels of seniority
being "tainted". 10 Left unanswered is the question of whether
there is a role for more careful streamlining of decision
processes before the fact, so that adherence to those processes
becomes itself an element of accountability after the fact.
3. What Is the "Public Interest", Anyway?
The emphasis on process that I am advocating raises squarely
the issue of how the "public interest" is discerned in these
decisions. Stenning has clearly identified this as crucial to
justifying action or inaction by an Attorney General in relation
to a prosecution. The BAEcase is a good example of some of the
issues here. First, it shows that there can be competing
legitimate interpretations of the public interest. How are
officials to weigh the public interest in the credibility of the rule
of law against the public interest in diffusing threats to citizens'
lives? Does the invocation of "national security" always trump
other considerations? What would count as compelling
evidence of those threats? Is an analysis of the public interest
that involves an Attorney General's prosecutorial decisions
destined to be always episodic and not conducive to structured
criteria? We should note here that Attorneys General are not
the only arm of government vested with a responsibility to
discern the public interest. A variety of regulatory structures
and processes also require this as well. Indeed the rise of
administrative government is an acknowledgement that
decisions about the public interest should be made by those
with some sense of experience, history, and specialized skills in
the relevant arena of administrative justice. Much of the
trajectory of administrative law has arguably been to provide
an infrastructure for administrative decisions to be made in a
rational, predictable manner and to be shielded from the
9. A representative example is the "Code of Conduct for Crown Prosecutors",
promulgated by the Alberta Ministry of Justice and Attorney General: see
< http://www.justice.gov.ab.ca/criminalpros/default.aspx?id = 5639 >.
10. And particularly the requirement that interventions by the Attorney General
in prosecutorial decision-making be "documented and published".
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possibility of "political interference"."' Yet scholars of
administrative discretion are increasingly interested in the
question of whether there is some role for "democratic
deliberation" in ascribing content to the public interest that is
applied by regulators in various arenas. As Feintuck puts it,12
... in the emphasis it places on active citizen participation in deliberative
processes, civic republicanism might seem to offer a legitimate and
definite orientation for regulatory activity in the public interest, seeing
regulation in effect as a 'surrogate deliberative process', while
simultaneously requiring the accountability of those who exercise such
power.
In invoking notions of democratic deliberation, I
emphasize that I am not suggesting that individual
prosecutorial decisions could or should be subject to such
deliberation. Rather, the criteria to be weighed in specific
situations could be rendered more open for public debate. In
the BAE case for example, there clearly was some sense of
what were not appropriate considerations with respect to the
public interest. Thus commercial interests and the national
economic interest were not supposed to be relevant. Would
there be wide-ranging consensus about this, for example, in
the Canadian context? Is it even possible to enumerate in
advance better or worse interpretations of the public interest
in the type of politically charged prosecutorial decisions of
which Professor Stenning writes? Going back to my concern
for process, it was also clear from the BAE case that there
were representations made by some parties about how
officials should understand the public interest. These came
from entities like BAE itself and the Saudi government. This
again raises serious questions about where the evidence comes
from that is used to make a judgment about what the public
interest requires and whether those sources are sufficiently
inclusive.
4. Conclusion
While this brief comment has ultimately raised more
questions than it has answered, they have all been prompted
II. H.W. Arthurs, Without the Law (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1985).
12. Mike Feintuck "The Public Interest" in Regulation (New York, OUP, 2004).
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by Professor Stenning's close engagement with an important
exercise of criminal authority. He is once again to be
congratulated for prising open the fascinating issues here for
a new generation of criminal procedure scholars.
